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Abstract—Current cryptocurrencies, starting with Bitcoin,
build a decentralized blockchain-based transaction ledger, main-
tained through proofs-of-work that also serve to generate a
monetary supply. Such decentralization has benefits, such as
independence from national political control, but also significant
limitations in terms of computational costs and scalability. We
introduce RSCoin, a cryptocurrency framework in which central
banks maintain complete control over the monetary supply, but
rely on a distributed set of authorities, or mintettes, to prevent
double-spending. While monetary policy is centralized, RSCoin
still provides strong transparency and auditability guarantees. We
demonstrate, both theoretically and experimentally, the benefits
of a modest degree of centralization, such as the elimination
of wasteful hashing and a scalable system for avoiding double-
spending attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [25], introduced in 2009, and the many alternative
cryptocurrencies it has inspired (e.g., Litecoin and Ripple),
have achieved enormous success: financially, in November
2015, Bitcoin held a market capitalization of 4.8 billion USD
and 30 cryptocurrencies held a market capitalization of over 1
million USD. In terms of visibility, cryptocurrencies have been
accepted as a form of payment by an increasing number of
international merchants, such as the 150,000 merchants using
either Coinbase or Bitpay as a payment gateway provider.
Recently, major financial institutions such as JPMorgan
Chase [28] and Nasdaq [27] have announced plans to develop
blockchain technologies. The potential impacts of cryptocur-
rencies have now been acknowledged even by government
institutions: the European Central Bank anticipates their “impact
on monetary policy and price stability” [8]; the US Federal
Reserve their ability to provide a “faster, more secure and more
efficient payment system” [5]; and the UK Treasury vowed to
“support innovation” [13] in this space. This is unsurprising,
since the financial settlement systems currently in use by central
banks (e.g., CHAPS, TARGET2, and Fedwire) remain relatively
expensive and — at least behind the scenes — have high latency
and are stagnant in terms of innovation.
Despite their success, existing cryptocurrencies suffer from
a number of limitations. Arguably the most troubling one is
their poor scalability: the Bitcoin network (currently by far
the most heavily used) can handle at most 7 transactions per
second1 and faces significant challenges in raising this rate
much higher,2 whereas PayPal handles over 100 and Visa
handles on average anywhere from 2,000 to 7,000. This lack of
scalability is ultimately due to its reliance on broadcast and the
need to expend significant computational energy in proofs-
of-work — by some estimates [26, Chapter 5], comparable
to the power consumption of a large power plant — in order
to manage the transaction ledger and make double-spending
attacks prohibitively expensive. Alternative cryptocurrencies
such as Litecoin try to distribute this cost, and Permacoin [24]
tries to repurpose the computation, but ultimately neither of
these solutions eliminates the costs. A second key limitation of
current cryptocurrencies is the loss of control over monetary
supply, providing little to no flexibility for macroeconomic
policy and extreme volatility in their value as currencies.
Against this backdrop, we present RSCoin, a cryptocur-
rency framework that decouples the generation of the monetary
supply from the maintenance of the transaction ledger. Our
design decisions were largely motivated by the desire to create
a more scalable cryptocurrency, but were also inspired by the
research agenda of the Bank of England [3], and the question
of “whether central banks should themselves make use of
such technology to issue digital currencies.” Indeed, as Bitcoin
becomes increasingly widespread, we expect that this will be
a question of interest to many central banks around the world.
RSCoin’s radical shift from traditional cryptocurrencies is
to centralize the monetary supply. Every unit of a particular
currency is created by a particular central bank, making
cryptocurrencies based on RSCoin significantly more palatable
to governments. Despite this centralization, RSCoin still
provides the benefit over existing (non-crypto) currencies
of a transparent transaction ledger, a distributed system for
maintaining it, and a globally visible monetary supply. This
makes monetary policy transparent, allows direct access to
payments and value transfers, supports pseudonymity, and
benefits from innovative uses of blockchains and digital money.
Centralization of the monetary authority also allows
RSCoin to address some of the scalability issues of fully
decentralized cryptocurrencies. In particular, as we describe
in Section VI, the central bank delegates the authority of
validating transactions to a number of other institutions that
we call mintettes (following Laurie [19]). Since mintettes are —
unlike traditional cryptocurrency miners — known and may
ultimately be held accountable for any misbehavior, RSCoin
supports a simple and fast mechanism for double-spending
detection. As described in Section V, we adapt a variant
1http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Scalability
2http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Blocksize debate
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of Two-Phase Commit, optimized to ensure the integrity of
a transaction ledger. Thus, we achieve a significantly more
scalable system: the modest experimental testbed that we
describe in Section V-D2 (consisting of only 30 mintettes
running a basic Python implementation of our consensus
mechanism), can process over 2,000 transactions per second,
and performance scales linearly as we increase the number of
mintettes. Most transactions take less than one second to clear,
as compared to many minutes in traditional cryptocurrency
designs.
Beyond scalability, recent issues in the Bitcoin network
have demonstrated that the incentives of miners may be
misaligned,3 and recent research suggests that this problem —
namely, that miners are incentivized to produce blocks without
fully validating all the transactions they contain — is only
exacerbated in other cryptocurrencies [21]. We therefore discuss
in Section VI-B1 how mintettes may collect fees for good
service, and how such fees may be withheld from misbehaving
or idle mintettes; our hope is that this framework can lead to a
more robust set of incentives. In a real deployment of RSCoin,
we furthermore expect mintettes to be institutions with an
existing relationship to the central bank, such as commercial
banks, and thus to have some existing incentives to perform
this service.
The ultimate goal for RSCoin is to achieve not only a
scalable cryptocurrency that can be deployed and whose supply
can be controlled by one central bank, but a framework that
allows any central bank to deploy their own cryptocurrency.
In fact, there is interest [2] to allow other entities to not
only issue instruments that hold value (such as shares and
derivative products), but to furthermore allow some visibility
into transactions concerning them. With this in mind, we discuss
in Section VII-C what is needed to support some notion of
interoperability between different deployments of RSCoin,
how different currencies can be exchanged in a transparent
and auditable way, and how various considerations — such as
a pair of central banks that, for either security or geopolitical
reasons, do not support each other — can be resolved without
fragmenting the global monetary system. We also discuss other
extensions and optimizations in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Much of the research on cryptocurrencies either has ana-
lyzed the extent to which existing properties (e.g., anonymity
and fairness) are satisfied or has proposed new methods to
improve certain features. We focus on those works that are
most related to the issues that we aim to address, namely
stability and scalability.
The work on these two topics has been largely attack-based,
demonstrating that even Bitcoin’s heavyweight mechanisms do
not provide perfect solutions. As demonstrated by Eyal and
Sirer [9] and Garay et al. [10], an attacker can temporarily
withhold blocks and ultimately undermine fairness. Babaioff et
al. [1] argued that honest participation in the Bitcoin network
was not sufficiently incentivized, and Johnson et al. [14] and
Laszka et al. [18] demonstrated that in fact some participants
might be incentivized to engage in denial-of-service attacks
against each other. Karame et al. [15] and Rosenfeld [31]
3https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2015-07-04-spv-mining
CC e-cash Bitcoin RSCoin
Double-spending online offline online online
Money generation C C D C
Ledger generation C n.a. D D*
Transparent no no yes yes
Pseudonymous no yes yes yes
TABLE I: How existing approaches (credit cards, cryptographic
e-cash, and Bitcoin) and how RSCoin compare in terms of
the properties they provide. Double-spending refers to the way
the system detects double-spending (i.e., as it happens or after
the fact). C stands for centralized, D for decentralized, and D*
for distributed.
consider how an adversary might take advantage of both mining
power and the network topology to execute a double-spending
attack. Finally, Gervais et al. [11] looked at the structure of
mining pools, the rise of SPV clients, and the privileged rights
of Bitcoin developers and concluded that Bitcoin was far from
achieving full decentralization. On the positive side, Kroll et
al. [17] analyzed a simplified model of the Bitcoin network
and concluded that Bitcoin is (at least weakly) stable.
In terms of other constructions, the work perhaps most
related to our own is Laurie’s approach of designated authori-
ties [19]. This solution, however, does not describe a consensus
mechanism or consider a centralized entity responsible for the
generation of a monetary supply. The RSCoin framework is
also related to the approaches adopted by Ripple and Stellar,
in that the underlying consensus protocols [22, 32] used by all
three sit somewhere between a fully decentralized setting — in
which proof-of-work-based “Nakamoto consensus” [6] has thus
far been adopted almost unilaterally — and a fully centralized
setting (in which consensus is trivial). Within this space,
RSCoin makes different trust assumptions and thus ends up
with different features: both the Stellar and Ripple consensus
protocols avoid a central point of trust, but at the cost of
needing a broadcast channel (because the list of participants is
not fixed a priori) and requiring servers to be in constant direct
communication, whereas our use of a central bank — which,
leaving aside any scalability benefits, is ultimately one of the
main goals of this work — allows us to avoid both broadcast
channels (because the set of mintettes is known and thus users
can contact them directly) and direct communication between
mintettes.
Finally, our approach borrows ideas from a number of
industrial solutions. In particular, our two-layered approach
to the blockchain is in part inspired by the Bitcoin startup
Factom, and our consensus mechanism is in part inspired
by Certificate Transparency [20]. In particular, RSCoin, like
Certificate Transparency, uses designated authorities and relies
on transparency and auditability to ensure integrity of a ledger,
rather than full trust in a central party.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present a brief background on Bitcoin
and traditional cryptocurrencies, and introduce some relevant
notation. Since RSCoin adopts properties of other online pay-
ment systems, such as those of credit cards and cryptographic
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e-cash, we highlight some of the advantages and disadvantages
of each of these approaches in Table I.
A. The Bitcoin protocol
Bitcoin is a decentralized cryptocurrency introduced in a
whitepaper in 2008 [25] and deployed on January 3 2009. Since
then, Bitcoin has achieved success and has inspired a number of
alternative cryptocurrencies (often dubbed “altcoins”) that are
largely based on the same blockchain technology. The novelty
of this blockchain technology is that it fulfills the two key
requirements of a currency — the generation of a monetary
supply and the establishment of a transaction ledger — in a
completely decentralized manner: a global peer-to-peer network
serves both to generate new units of currency and to bear
witness to the transfer of existing units from one party to
another through transaction broadcast and computational proof-
of-work protocols.
To highlight the differences between RSCoin and fully
decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, we sketch
the main operations and entities of these blockchain-based
currencies; for a more comprehensive overview, we refer the
reader to Bonneau et al. [6]. Briefly, users can generate signing
keypairs and use the public key as a pseudonym or address in
which to store some units of the underlying cryptocurrency. To
transfer the value stored in this address to the address of another
user, he creates a transaction, which is cryptographically signed
using the secret key associated with this address. More generally,
transactions can transfer value from m input addresses to n
output addresses, in which case the transaction must be signed
by the secret keys associated with each of the input addresses.
Once a user has created a transaction, it is broadcast to
his peers in the network, and eventually reaches miners. A
miner seals the transaction into the global ledger by including
it in a pool of transactions, which she then hashes — along
with some metadata and, crucially, a nonce — to attempt to
produce a hash below a target value (defined by the difficulty
of the network). Once a miner is successful in producing
such a hash, she broadcasts the pool of transactions and its
associated hash as a block. Among the metadata for a block
is a reference to the previously mined block, allowing the
acceptance of the miner’s block into the blockchain to be
signaled by the broadcast of another block with a reference
to hers (or, in practice, many subsequent blocks). Miners
are incentivized by two rewards: the collection of optional
fees in individual transactions, and a system-specific mining
reward (e.g., as of November 2015, Bitcoin’s mining reward
of 25 BTC). These rewards are collected in a special coin
generation transaction that the miner includes in her block’s
pool of transactions. Crucially, blocks serve to not only generate
the monetary supply (via the mining rewards included in each
block), but also to provide a partial ordering for transactions:
transactions in one block come before transactions included in
any block further along the blockchain. This allows all users in
the network to eventually impose a global (partial) ordering on
transactions, and thus thwart double-spending by maintaining a
list of unspent transaction outputs and validating a transaction
only if its input addresses appear in this list.
What we have described above is the typical way of
explaining Bitcoin at a high level, but we mention that in reality,
bitcoins are not “stored” in an address or “sent”; instead, the
sender relinquishes control by broadcasting a transaction that
re-assigns to the recipient’s address the bitcoins previously
associated with that of the sender. An input to a transaction is
thus not an address but a (signed) script that specifies an index
in a previous transaction in which some bitcoins were received;
this address identifier uniquely identifies one particular usage
of an address, which becomes important as addresses are reused.
In what follows, we thus frequently use the notation for an
address and for a transaction-index pair interchangeably.
B. Notation
We denote a hash function as H(·) and a signature scheme
as the tuple (Sig.KeyGen,Sig.Sign,Sig.Verify), where these
algorithms behave as follows: via (pk, sk) $←− Sig.KeyGen(1λ)
one generates a signing keypair; via σ $←− Sig.Sign(sk,m) one
generates a signature; and via 0/1← Sig.Verify(pk,m, σ) one
verifies a signature on a message.
We use addr to denote an address; this is identical to a public
key pk in terms of the underlying technology,4 but we use the
separate term to disambiguate between usage in a transaction
(where we use addr) and usage as a signature verification
key (where we use pk). We use tx({addri}i n−→ {addrj}j) to
denote a transaction in which n units of currency are sent from
{addri}i to {addrj}j . Each usage of an address addr can be
uniquely identified by the tuple addrid = (tx, indextx(addr), v),
where tx is the hash of the transaction in which it received
some value v, and indextx(addr) is the index of addr in the list
of outputs. When we use these address identifiers later on, we
occasionally omit information (e.g., the value v) if it is already
implicit or unnecessary.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF RSCOIN
In this section, we provide a brief overview of RSCoin,
which will be useful for understanding both its underlying con-
sensus algorithm (presented in Section V) and the composition
of the system as a whole (presented in Section VI).
At a high level, RSCoin introduces a degree of central-
ization into the two typically decentralized components of a
blockchain-based ledger: the generation of the monetary supply
and the constitution of the transaction ledger. In its simplest
form, the RSCoin system assumes two structural entities: the
central bank, a centralized entity that ultimately has complete
control over the generation of the monetary supply, and a
distributed set of mintettes (following Laurie [19]) that are
responsible for the maintenance of the transaction ledger. The
interplay between these entities — and an overview of RSCoin
as a whole — can be seen in Figure 1.
Briefly, mintettes collect transactions from users and collate
them into blocks, much as is done with traditional cryptocur-
rencies. These mintettes differ from traditional cryptocurrency
miners, however, in a crucial way: rather than performing
some computationally difficult task, each mintette is simply
authorized by the central bank to collect transactions. In
RSCoin, this authorization is accomplished by a PKI-type
functionality, meaning the central bank signs the public key of
4Or, as in Bitcoin, it may be some hashed version of the public key.
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Fig. 1: The overall structure of RSCoin. Each mintettes main-
tains a set of lower-level blocks, and (possibly) communicates
with other mintettes (either directly or indirectly). At some
point, the mintettes send these blocks to the central bank, which
produces a higher-level block. It is these higher-level blocks
that form a chain and that are visible to external users.
the mintette, and each lower-level block must contain one of
these signatures in order to be considered valid. We refer to the
time interval in which blocks are produced by mintettes as an
epoch, where the length of an epoch varies depending on the
mintette. Because these blocks are not ultimately incorporated
into the main blockchain, we refer to them as lower-level blocks.
Mintettes are collectively responsible for producing a consistent
ledger, and thus to facilitate this process they communicate
internally throughout the course of an epoch — in an indirect
manner described in Section V — and ultimately reference not
only their own previous blocks but also the previous blocks of
each other. This means that these lower-level blocks form a
(potentially) cross-referenced chain.
At the end of some longer pre-defined time interval called
a period, the mintettes present their blocks to the central bank,
which merges these lower-level blocks to form a consistent
history in the form of a new block. This higher-level block
is what is ultimately incorporated into the main blockchain,
meaning a user of RSCoin need only keep track of higher-
level blocks. (Special users wishing to audit the behavior of
the mintettes and the central bank, however, may keep track
of lower-level blocks, and we describe in Section V-C ways to
augment lower-level blocks to improve auditability.)
Interaction with RSCoin can thus be quite similar to
interaction with existing cryptocurrencies, as the structure of
its blockchain is nearly identical, and users can create new
pseudonyms and transactions in the same way as before. In fact,
we stress that RSCoin is intended as a framework rather than a
stand-alone cryptocurrency, so one could imagine incorporated
techniques from various existing cryptocurrencies in order
to achieve various goals. For example, to ensure privacy for
transactions, one could adapt existing cryptographic techniques
such as those employed by Zerocoin [23], Zerocash [4],
Pinocchio Coin [7], or Groth and Kohlweiss [12]. As these
goals are somewhat orthogonal to the goals of this paper, we
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Fig. 2: The proposed protocol for validating transactions; each
mintette mi is an owner of address i. In (1), a user learns
the owners of each of the addresses in its transaction. In (2),
the user collects approval from a majority of the owners of
the input addresses. In (3), the user sends the transaction and
these approvals to the owners of the transaction identifier. In
(4), some subset of these mintettes add the transaction to their
blocks.
leave a comprehensive exploration of how privacy-enhancing
and other techniques can be combined with RSCoin as an
interesting avenue for future work.
V. ACHIEVING CONSENSUS
In the previous section, we described how mintettes send
so-called “lower-level blocks” to the central bank at the end
of a period. In this section, we describe a consensus protocol
by which these blocks can already be made consistent when
they are sent to the central bank, thus ensuring that the overall
system remains scalable by allowing the central bank to do the
minimal work necessary.
As described in the introduction, one of the major benefits of
centralization is that, although the generation of the transaction
ledger is still distributed, consensus on valid transactions
can be reached in a way that avoids the wasteful proofs-
of-work required by existing cryptocurrencies. In traditional
cryptocurrencies, the set of miners is neither known nor trusted,
meaning one has no choice but to broadcast a transaction
to the entire network and rely on proof-of-work to defend
against Sybil attacks. Since our mintettes are in fact authorized
by the central bank, and thus both known and — because of
their accountability — trusted to some extent, we can avoid the
heavyweight consensus requirement of more fully decentralized
cryptocurrencies and instead use an adapted version of Two-
Phase Commit (2PC), as presented in Figure 2. A generic
consensus protocol, ensuring total ordering of transactions,
is not necessary for double-spending prevention; instead, a
weaker property — namely that any transaction output features
as a transaction input in at most one other transaction — is
sufficient. RSCoin builds its consensus protocol for double-
spending prevention based on this insight.
We begin by describing a threat model for the consensus
protocol before going on to present a basic protocol that
achieves consensus on transactions (Section V-B), an augmented
protocol that allows for auditability of both the mintettes and
the central bank (Section V-C), and a performance evaluation
(Section V-D).
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A. Threat model and security properties
We always assume that the central bank is honest —
although we describe in Section VI-B1 ways to detect certain
types of misbehavior on the part of the bank — and that the
underlying cryptography is secure; i.e., no parties may violate
the standard properties offered by the hash function and digital
signature. Honest mintettes follow the protocols as specified,
whereas dishonest mintettes may behave arbitrarily; i.e., they
may deviate from the prescribed protocols, and selectively
or broadly ignore requests from users. Finally, honest users
create only valid transactions (i.e., ones in which they own the
input addresses and have not yet spent their contents), whereas
dishonest users may try to double-spend or otherwise subvert
the integrity of RSCoin.
We consider two threat models. Our first threat model
assumes that each transaction is processed by a set of mintettes
with an honest majority; this is different from assuming that a
majority of all mintettes are honest, as we will see in our
description of transaction processing in Section V-B. Our
second threat model assumes that no mintette is honest, and
that mintettes may further collude to violate the integrity of
RSCoin. This is a very hostile setting, but we show that some
security properties still hold for honest users. Additionally, we
show that mintettes that misbehave in certain ways can be
detected and ultimately held accountable, which may serve as
an incentive to follow the protocols correctly.
In the face of these different adversarial settings, we try to
satisfy at least some of the following key integrity properties:
v No double-spending: Each output address of a
valid transaction will only ever be associated with
the input of at most one other valid transaction.
v Non-repudiable sealing: The confirmation that a
user receives from a mintette — which promises
that a transaction will be included in the ledger —
can be used to implicate that mintette if the
transaction does not appear in the next block.
v Timed personal audits: A user can, given access
to the lower-level blocks produced within a period,
ensure that the implied behavior of a mintette
matches the behavior observed at the time of any
previous interactions with that mintette.
v Universal audits: Anyone with access to the
lower-level blocks produced within a period can
audit all transactions processed by all mintettes. In
particular, mintettes cannot retroactively modify,
omit, or insert transactions in the ledger.
v Exposed inactivity: Anyone with access to the
lower-level blocks produced within a period can
observe any mintette’s substantial absence from
participation in the 2PC protocol. (In particular,
then, a mintette cannot retroactively act to claim
transaction fees for services not provided in a
timely manner.)
To see how to satisfy these security properties, we first
present our basic consensus protocol in Section V-B, and then
present in Section V-C ways to augment this protocol to achieve
auditability. We then prove that at least some subset of these
security properties can be captured in both our threat models,
and that exposure may disincentive mintettes from violating
those that we cannot capture directly.
B. A basic consensus protocol
To begin, the space of possible transaction identifiers is
divided so that each mintette m is responsible for some subset,
or “shard.” For reliability and security, each shard is covered
by (potentially) multiple mintettes, and everyone is aware of
the owner(s) of each.
We use owners(addrid) to denote the set of mintettes
responsible for addrid. Recall that addrid = (tx, i, v), where
tx specifies the transaction in which addr, at sequential output
i, received value v. We map each addrid to a shard using tx
by hashing a canonical representation of the transaction. As
a result, all input addrid in a transaction may have different
owners (because the addresses may have appeared as an output
in different transactions), but all output addrid have the same
owner (because they are all appearing as an output in the
same transaction). For simplicity, we therefore use the notation
owners(Sout) below (where Sout is the list of output addresses
for a transaction).
In each period, each mintette m is responsible for main-
taining two lists concerning only the addrid (and indirectly the
transactions tx) it owns: a list of unspent transaction outputs,
denoted utxo, and two lists of transactions seen thus far in
the period, denoted pset and txset respectively (the former
is used to detect double-spending, and the latter is used to
seal transactions into the ledger). The utxo list is of the form
addrid 7→ (addr, v), where (addrid 7→ (addr, v)) ∈ utxo
indicates that addrid had not acted as an input address at
the start of the period but has since sent value v to addr and
(addrid 7→ (⊥,⊥)) ∈ utxo indicates that addrid has not yet
spent its contents. The pset list is of the form addrid 7→ tx,
where (addrid 7→ tx) ∈ pset indicates that addrid has acted
as an input address in transaction tx. We assume that each
mintette starts the period with an accurate utxo list (i.e., all
transactions within the mintette’s shard in which the outputs
have not yet been spent) and with an empty pset.
At some point in the period, a user creates a transaction.
The user5 can now run Algorithm V.1.6
In the first phase, the user asks the relevant mintettes to
“vote” on the transaction; i.e., to decide if its input addresses
have not already been used, and thus certify that no double-
spending is taking place. To do this, the user determines
the owners for each input address, and sends the transaction
information to these mintettes, who each run Algorithm V.2.
We omit for simplicity the formal description of an algorithm
CheckTx that, on input a transaction, checks that the basic
structure of the transaction is valid; i.e., that the collective
input value is at least equal to the collective output value, that
the input address identifiers point to valid previous transactions,
and that the signatures authorizing previous transaction outputs
to be spent are valid.
5We refer to the user here and in the sequel, but in practice this can all be
done by the underlying client, without any need for input from the (human)
user.
6All algorithms are assumed to be executed atomically and sequentially by
each party, although as we demonstrate in Section V-D2, implementing them
using optimistic locking is possible to increase parallelism and efficiency.
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Algorithm V.1: Validating a transaction, run by a user
Input: a transaction tx(Sin
n−→ Sout) and period identifier
j
1 bundle← ∅
//first phase: collect votes
2 forall the addrid ∈ Sin do
3 M ← owners(addrid)
4 forall the m ∈M do
5 (pkm, σ)←
CheckNotDoubleSpent(tx, addrid,m)
6 if (pkm, σ) = ⊥ then
7 return ⊥
8 else
9 bundle← bundle ∪ {((m, addrid) 7→
(pkm, σ))}
//second phase: commit
10 M ← owners(Sout)
11 forall the m ∈M do
12 (pkm, σ)← CommitTx(tx, j, bundle,m)
Algorithm V.2: CheckNotDoubleSpent, run by a mintette
Input: a transaction txc, an address identifier
addrid = (tx, i) and a mintette identifier m
1 if CheckTx(txc) = 0 or m /∈ owners(addrid) then
2 return ⊥
3 else
4 if (addrid ∈ utxom) or ((addrid 7→ txc) ∈ psetm)
then
5 utxom ← utxom \ {addrid}
6 psetm ← psetm ∪ {(addrid 7→ txc)}
7 return (pkm,Sig.Sign(skm, (txc, addrid)))
8 else
9 return ⊥
Briefly, in Algorithm V.2 the mintette first checks if the
current transaction is valid and if the address is within its remit,
and returns⊥ otherwise. It then proceeds if the address identifier
either has not been spent before (and thus is in utxo), or if it has
already been associated with the given transaction (and thus the
pair is in pset). In those cases, it removes the address identifier
from utxo and associates it with the transaction in pset; these
actions are idempotent and can be safely performed more than
once. The mintette then returns a signed acknowledgment to the
user. If instead another transaction appears in pset associated
with the address identifier, then the address is acting as an input
in two different transactions — i.e., it is double-spending — and
the mintette returns ⊥. It may also store the two transactions
to provide evidence of double spending.
At the end of the first phase, an honest user will have
received some signatures (representing ‘yes’ votes) from the
owners of the input addresses of the new transaction. Users
should check the signatures returned by these mintettes and
immediately return a failure if any is invalid. Once the user
has received signatures from at least a majority of owners for
each input, she can now send the transaction, coupled with a
“bundle of evidence” (consisting of the signatures of the input
mintettes) to represent its validity, to the owners of the output
addresses (who, recall, are the same for all output addresses).
Algorithm V.3: CommitTx, run by a mintette
Input: a transaction tx(Sin
n−→ Sout), a period identifier
j, a bundle of evidence
bundle = {((mi, addridi) 7→ (pki, σi))}i, and a
mintette identifier m
1 if CheckTx(tx) = 0 or m /∈ owners(Sout) then
2 return ⊥
3 else
4 d← 1
5 forall the addrid ∈ Sin do
6 forall the m′ ∈ owners(addrid) do
7 if (m′, addrid) ∈ bundle then
8 (pk, σ)← bundle[(m′, addrid)]
9 d′ ← d ∧H(pk) ∈ DPKj
∧ Sig.Verify(pk, (tx, addrid), σ)
10 else
11 d← 0
12 if d = 0 then
13 return ⊥
14 else
15 utxom ← utxom ∪ Sout
16 txsetm ← txsetm ∪ {tx}
17 return (pkm,Sig.Sign(skm, tx))
These mintettes then run Algorithm V.3.
In Algorithm V.3, a mintette first checks the transaction
and whether it falls within its remit. The mintette then checks
the bundle of evidence by verifying that all — or, in practice,
at least a majority — of mintettes associated with each input
are all included, that the input mintettes were authorized to
act as mintettes in the current period, and that their signatures
verify. If these checks pass and the transaction has not been
seen before, then the mintette adds all the output addresses
for the transaction to its utxo list and adds the transaction to
txset. The mintette then sends to the user evidence that the
transaction will be included in the higher-level block (which a
user may later use to implicate the mintette if this is not the
case).
At the end of the period, all mintettes send txset to the
central bank, along with additional information in order to
achieve integrity, which we discuss in the next section.
a) Security: In our first threat model, where all transac-
tions are processed by a set of mintettes with honest majority,
it is clear that (1) no double-spending transactions will be
accepted into txset by honest mintettes, and (2) the confirmation
given to a user in Line 17 of Algorithm V.3 can be wielded
by the user as evidence that the mintette promised to seal
the transaction. Thus, in our first threat model — in which
all transactions are processed by a set of mintettes with
honest majority — the first and second integrity properties
in Section V-A are already satisfied by our basic consensus
protocol.
b) Communication overhead: Importantly, all commu-
nication between the mintettes is done indirectly via the
user (using the bundles of evidence), and there is no di-
rect communication between them. This allows for a low
communication overhead for the mintettes, especially with
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respect to existing systems such as Bitcoin and Ripple/Stellar
(in which the respective miners and servers must be in
constant communication), which facilitates — as we will see in
Section V-D2 — the scalability and overall performance benefits
of RSCoin.
C. Achieving auditability
While our basic consensus mechanism already achieves
some of our desired integrity properties (at least in our weaker
threat model), it is still not clear that it provides any stronger
notions of integrity, or that it provides any integrity in a more
hostile environment. To address this limitation, we present
in this section a way to augment both the lower-level blocks
discussed in Section VI-A and the basic consensus mechanism.
At a high level, a mintette now maintains a high-integrity log
that highlights both its own key actions, as well as the actions
of those mintettes with whom it has indirectly interacted (i.e.,
from whom it has received signatures, ferried through the user,
in the process of committing a transaction).
In more detail, each mintette maintains a log of absolutely
ordered actions along with their notional sequence number.
Actions may have one of three types: Query, Commit and
CloseEpoch. The Query action signals an update to pset as a
result of an input address being assigned to a new transaction
(Line 6 of Algorithm V.2), so for this action the log includes
the new transaction. The Commit action signals an update to
utxo and txset as a result of receiving a new valid transaction
(lines 15 and 16 of Algorithm V.3, respectively), so for this
action the log includes the transaction and its corresponding
bundle of evidence.
To facilitate the CloseEpoch action, each mintette stores
not only the log itself but also a rolling hash chain; i.e., a
head that acts as a witness to the current state of the log, so
hseq = H(aseq‖hseq−1), where aseq is the log entry of the
action and hseq−1 is the previous head of the chain.
To share this witness, mintettes include a signed head in
every message they emit; i.e., in line 7 of Algorithm V.2
and line 17 of Algorithm V.3, the mintette m computes
σ
$←− Sig.Sign(skm, (txc, addrid, h, seq) (where h is the head
of its chain) rather than σ $←− Sig.Sign(skm, (txc, addrid)), and
outputs (pkm, σ, h, seq). Now that mintettes are potentially
aware of each others’ logs, the CloseEpoch action — which,
appropriately, marks the end of an epoch — includes in the log
the heads of the other chains of which the mintette is aware,
along with their sequence number. This results in the head of
each mintette’s chain depending on the latest known head of
both its own and other chains; we refer to this phenomenon
as cross-hashing (which, in effect, implements a cryptographic
variant of vector clocks [30]).
We can now argue that these augmented lower-level blocks
provide sufficient insight into the actions of the mintettes that
stronger notions of integrity can be achieved. In particular, we
have the following lemma:
Lemma V.1. In both of our threat models, the augmented
consensus protocol outlined above provides timed personal
audits, universal audits, and exposed inactivity (as defined in
Section V-A).
Proof: (Informal.) To prove that our protocol provides
timed personal audits, observe that if the log reported by any
mintette (or equivalently its hash at any log position) forks at
any point from the record of a user or other mintette, then the
signed head of the hash chain serves as evidence that the log
is different. To remain undetected, the mintette must therefore
provide users with the signed head of a hash chain that is a
prefix of the actual hash chain it will report. Both the Query
and Commit messages leading to a signed hash, however,
modify the action log. Providing an outdated hash thus would
not contain the latest action, so again there is evidence that
such an action should have been recorded (in the form of the
signed response to the message that should prompt the action),
which also incriminates the mintette. Thus a mintette that does
not wish to be detected and incriminated may only refrain from
responding to requests requiring actions that would change its
log.
To prove that our protocol provides universal audits and
exposed inactivity, we first note that, despite the lack of
synchronization between mintettes within periods, we can detect
when an action is committed to a mintette log a ‘significant
time’ after another action. This is due to the fact that the second
message of the 2PC protocol that users send to mintettes carries
the hash heads from all input mintettes involved. This forms
a low-degree random graph with good expansion properties,
and we expect that in a short amount of time mintettes will
have hash chains dependent on the hash chains of all other
mintettes. Thus, if two actions are separated by a sufficiently
long period of time, it is extremely likely that a head dependent
on the first action has propagated to a super-majority of other
mintettes. Checking this property allows us to detect which
came first with very high probability. Using this observation,
everyone may audit claims that a mintette contributed to an
action (e.g., processing the first query of the 2PC protocol for
a valid transaction) in a timely fashion, by using the process
above to detect whether the claimed action from the mintette
is or is not very likely to have come after the same action was
committed by all other mintettes concerned.
Finally, RSCoin makes the key security assumption that all
shards are composed of an honest majority of mintettes. This is
not quite the same as assuming an overall honest majority
of mintettes, but it can be related to the more traditional
assumption that each mintette behaves honest with some
probability, as we demonstrate in the following lemma:
Lemma V.2. Given a fraction of α corrupt mintettes, the
probability that y shards, composed each of Q mintettes, all
have an honest majority is
Pr[secure] = F
(
Q− 1
2
;Q;α
)y
,
where F (k;N ; p) is the cumulative distribution function of
a binomial distribution over a population of size N with a
probability of success p.
Proof: The probability that a single shard composed from
random mintettes has an honest majority is directly the cumu-
lative distribution ρ = F
(
Q−1
2 ;Q;α
)
. Since security requires
an honest majority across all shards we get Pr[secure] = ρy.
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This lemma demonstrates that the higher the number of
shards, the lower the probability that all of them will be secure
(i.e., covered by an honest majority of mintettes). Thus, we
recommend fixing the number of shards, on the basis of load
balancing requirements, to the smallest practical number. A
mapping can then be defined between the address space and
the shards by simply partitioning equally the space of address
identifiers amongst them. For a given total number of mintettes
M , the minimal number of shards of size Q that should be
used is bM/Qc.
D. Performance
1) Theoretical analysis: Looking back at the algorithms in
Section V-B, we can get at least a theoretical estimate of the
communication and computational complexity of the system.
Denote by T the set of transactions that are generated per
second; by Q the number of mintettes that own each address;
and by M the number of total mintettes.
For a transaction with m inputs and n outputs, a user sends
and receives at most mQ messages in the first phase of the
2PC protocol (line 5 of Algorithm V.1) and sends and receives
at most Q messages in the second phase (line 12). For the user,
each transaction thus requires at most 2(m+ 1)Q messages.
In terms of the communication complexity per mintette,
we assume that each mintette receives a proportional share
of the total transactions, which is ensured as the volume of
transactions grow, by the bank allocating shards of equal sizes
to all mintettes. Then the work per mintette is∑
tx∈T 2(mtx + 1)Q
M
.
In particular, this scales infinitely: as more mintettes are added
to the system, the work per mintette decreases (in a linear
fashion) and eventually goes to zero.
2) Experimental analysis: To verify these performance
estimates and to measure the latency a typical user would
experience to confirm a transaction, we implemented the basic
consensus mechanism presented in Section V-B and measured
its performance on a modest cluster hosted on Amazon’s
Elastic Compute (EC2) infrastructure. Our implementation7
consists of 2458 lines of Python code: 1109 lines define the
core transaction structure, cryptographic processing, and 2PC
protocols as a Twisted service and client; 780 lines are devoted
to unit and timing tests; and 569 lines use the Fabric framework
to do configuration, deployment management (DevOps), live
testing, and visualizations. Both the clients and the mintettes
are implemented as single-threaded services following a reactor
pattern. All cryptographic operations use the OpenSSL wrapper
library petlib, and we instantiate the hash function and
digital signature using SHA-256 and ECDSA (over the NIST-
P224 curve, as optimized by Ka¨sper [16]) respectively. The
implementation and all configuration and orchestration files
necessary for replicating our results are available under a BSD
license.
Our experimental setup consisted of 30 mintettes, each
running on an Amazon EC2 t2.micro instance in the EU
(Ireland) data center (for reference, each cost $0.014 per hour
7Available at https://github.com/gdanezis/rscoin
Benchmark µ (s−1) σ
Hash 1,017,384.86 41,054.93
Sign 17,043.63 2316.40
Verify 4651.20 89.84
Check tx 3585.02 95.17
Query msg 1358.31 120.20
Commit msg 1006.49 31.66
TABLE II: Micro-benchmarks at the mintettes
as of August 2015). We assigned three mintettes to each shard
of the transaction space, so a quorum of at least two was
required for the 2PC. A different set of 25 servers on the same
data center was used for stress testing and estimating the peak
throughput in terms of transactions per second. Each of those
test machines issued 1000 transactions consisting of two inputs
and two outputs. For wide area networking latency experiments
we used a residential broadband cable service and an Ubuntu
14.02.2 LTS Linux VM running on a 64-bit Windows 7 laptop
with a 2.4GHz i7-4700MQ processor and 16GB RAM.
Table II reports the mean rate and the standard deviation of
key operations we rely on for RSCoin.8 Hash, Sign and Verify
benchmark the number of basic cryptographic operations each
mintette can perform per second (including the overhead of
our library and Python runtime).
For the other benchmarks, we consider a single transaction
with one input and two outputs (we observe that as of September
2014, 53% of Bitcoin transactions had this structure, so this is a
reasonable proxy for real usage). The check tx benchmark then
measures the rate at which a mintette can parse and perform
the cryptographic checks associated with this transaction. This
involves a single signature check, and thus its difference
from the Sign benchmark largely represents the overhead
of parsing and of binary conversion in Python. Guided by
this benchmark, we chose to represent ECDSA public keys
using uncompressed coordinates due to orders-of-magnitude
slowdowns when parsing keys in compressed form.
The query msg and commit msg benchmarks measure the
rate at which each mintette can process the first and second
message of the 2PC respectively for this transaction. These
include full de-serialization, checks from persistent storage of
the utxo, cryptographic checks, updates to the utxo, signing,
and serialization of responses. These benchmarks guided our
design towards not synchronizing to persistent storage the utxo
before each response, and relying instead on the quorum of
mintettes to ensure correctness (a design philosophy similar to
RAMCloud [29]). Persisting to storage before responding to
each request slowed these rates by orders of magnitude.
Figure 3 illustrates the latency a client would experience
when interacting with the mintettes. Figure 3a illustrates the
experiments with client machines within the data center, and
point to an intrinsic delay due to networking overheads and
cryptographic checks of less than 0.5 seconds. This includes
both phases of the 2PC.
8All measurements were performed on a single thread on a single core,
using a reactor pattern where networking was necessary.
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Fig. 3: Latency, in seconds, to perform the 2PC to validate a
payment for a transaction with freshly issued coins as inputs
(run 1), and transactions with two arbitrary previous transactions
as inputs (run 2).
Over a wide area network the latency increases (Figure 3b),
but under the conditions tested, the latency is still usually
well under a second for the full 2PC and all checks. We note
that no shortcuts were implemented: for each transaction, all
three mintettes for each input were contacted and expected to
respond in the first phase, and all three mintettes responsible
for the new transaction were contacted and have to respond in
the second phase. In reality, only a majority need to respond
before concluding each phase, and this may reduce latency
further.
Figure 4 plots the throughput of the system as we increase
the number of mintettes from 2 to 30, under the load of 25
synthetic clients, each pushing 1000 transactions. As expected,
when fewer than three mintettes are available the throughput
is roughly flat (fewer than 400 transactions per second), as
both phases of the 2PC need to contact all mintettes. Once
more than the minimum of three mintettes are available the
load is distributed across them: the first phase need to access
at most six mintettes (three for each of the two transaction
inputs), and the second phase at most three mintettes. This
load per transaction is independent of the number of mintettes
and as a result the throughput scales linearly, as predicted
in Section V-D1. After the initial three mintettes, each new
mintette adds approximately 66 additional transactions per
second to the capacity of the system.
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Fig. 4: Throughput (90th percentile and standard error), in
transactions per second, as a function of the number of mintettes,
for transactions with two freshly issued coins as inputs (run
1) and transactions with two arbitrary previous transactions as
inputs (run 2).
The gap between the micro-benchmarks relating to the
message processing for the two phases (1358.31 s−1 and
1006.49 s−1 respectively) and the rate of transactions observed
under end-to-end conditions (approximately 400 s−1) indicates
that at this point bandwidth, networking, or the interconnection
with the process are scaling bottlenecks for single mintettes.
In particular no pipelining was implemented as part of the
client (although the mintettes support it) and thus every request
initiates a fresh TCP connection, with the slowdowns and
resource consumption on the hosts that this entails.
VI. THE RSCOIN SYSTEM
With our consensus protocol in place, we now describe the
structure of RSCoin, focusing on the interaction between the
mintettes and the central bank, and on the overall parameters
and properties of the system. We first describe the structure and
usage of RSCoin (Sections VI-A and VI-B) and then address
considerations that arise in how to allocate fees to mintettes
(Section VI-B1); overlay RSCoin on top of an existing cryp-
tocurrency like Bitcoin (Section VI-B2); incentivize mintettes
to follow the consensus protocol and present a collectively
consistent ledger to the central bank (Section VI-C); and set
concrete choices for various system parameters (Section VI-D).
A. Lower-level blocks
A lower-level block produced by a mintette m within periodi
looks like b = (h, txset, σ,mset), where h is a hash, txset is
a collection of transactions, and σ is a signature from the
mintette that produced this block. The fourth component mset
specifies the cross-chain property of lower-level blocks (recall
from Section V-C that mintettes may reference each others’
blocks) by identifying the hashes of the other previous blocks
that are being referenced.
Denote by pkbank the bank’s public key and by DPKi
the set of mintettes authorized by the bank in the previous
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higher-level block B(i−1)bank (as described in Section VI-B), and
define otherblocks ← h1‖ . . . ‖hn for mset = (h1, . . . , hn).
Assuming the block b is produced in epochj , to check that b
is valid one then checks that
1) h = H(h(i−1)bank ‖h(m)j−1‖otherblocks‖txset),
2) Sig.Verify(pkm, h, σ) = 1,
3) (pkm, σ
(m)
bank) ∈ DPKi for some σ(m)bank, and
4) Sig.Verify(pkbank, (pkm, periodi), σ
(m)
bank) = 1.
To form a lower-level block, a mintette uses the trans-
action set txset it has formed throughout the epoch (as
described in Section V-B) and the hashes (h1, . . . , hn) that
it has received from other mintettes (as ferried through
the “bundle of evidence” described in Section V-C) and
creates mset ← (h1, . . . , hn), otherblocks ← h1‖ . . . ‖hn,
h ← H(h(i−1)bank ‖h(m)j−1‖otherblocks‖txset), and σ
$←−
Sig.Sign(skm, h).
B. Higher-level blocks
The higher-level block that marks the end of periodi looks
like B(i)bank = (h, txset, σ,DPKi+1), where these first three
values are similar to their counterparts in lower-level blocks
(i.e., a hash, a collection of transactions, and a signature), and
the set DPKi+1 contains pairs (pkm, σ
(m)
bank); i.e., the public
keys of the mintettes authorized for periodi+1 and the bank’s
signatures on the keys.
To check that a block is valid, one checks that
1) h = H(h(i−1)bank ‖txset),
2) Sig.Verify(pkbank, h, σ) = 1, and
3) Sig.Verify(pkbank, (pkm, periodi+1), σ
(m)
bank) = 1 for
all (pkm, σ
(m)
bank) ∈ DPKi+1.
To form a higher-level block, the bank must collate the
inputs it is given by the mintettes, which consist of the lower-
level blocks described above and the action logs described
in Section V-C. To create a consistent transaction set txset, a
vigilant bank might need to look through all of the transaction
sets it receives to detect double-spending, remove any conflict-
ing transactions, and identify the mintette(s) responsible for
including them. As this would require the bank to perform work
proportional to the number of transactions (and thus somewhat
obviate the reason for mintettes), we also consider an optimistic
approach in which the bank relies on the consensus protocol in
Section V and instead simply merges the individual transaction
sets to form txset. The bank then forms h← H(h(i−1)bank ‖txset),
σ
$←− Sig.Sign(pkbank, h), and creates the set of authorized
mintettes using a decision process we briefly discuss below
and in Section VI-C.
1) Coin generation and fee allocation: In addition to this
basic structure, each higher-level block could also contain
within txset a special coin generation transaction and an
allocation of fees to the mintettes that earned them in the
previous period. Semantically, the coin generation could take on
the same structure as in Bitcoin; i.e., it could be a transaction
tx(∅ n−→ addrbank), where addrbank is an address owned by
the bank, and fees could be allocated using a transaction
tx(addrbank
f−→ addrm), where f represents the fees owed to
m. The interesting question is thus not how central banks can
allocate fees to mintettes, but how it decides which mintettes
have earned these fees. In fact, the provided action logs allow
the central bank to identify active and live mintettes and allocate
fees to them appropriately.
This mechanism (roughly) works as follows. The central
bank keeps a tally of the mintettes that were involved in
certifying the validity of input addresses; i.e., those that replied
in the first phase of the consensus protocol. The choice to
reward input mintettes is deliberate: in addition to providing a
direct incentive for mintettes to respond in the first phase of
the protocol, it also provides an indirect incentive for mintettes
to respond in the second phase, as only a transaction output
that is marked as unspent can later be used as an input (for
which the mintette can then earn fees). Thus, rewarding input
mintettes provides incentive to handle a transaction throughout
its lifetime.
The action logs also play a crucial role in fee allocation.
In particular, the “exposed inactivity” security property from
Section V-C prevents an inactive mintette from becoming active
at a later time and claiming that it contributed to previous
transactions, as an examination of the action logs can falsify
such claims. Additionally, if fee allocation is determined on
the basis of a known function of the action logs, anyone with
access to the action logs can audit the actions of the central
bank.
Finally, we mention that although the logs are sent only
to the central bank, the expectation is that the central bank
will publish these logs to allow anyone to audit the system, as
well as the bank’s operation. As we assume the central bank is
honest, this does not present a problem, but in a stronger threat
model in which less trust were placed in the central bank,
one might instead attempt to adopt a broadcast system for
distributing logs (with the caveat that this approach introduces
significantly higher latency). In such a setting, anyone with
access to the logs could verify not only the actions of the
mintettes, but could also replay these actions to compare the
ledger agreed upon by the mintettes and the ledger published
by the bank; this would allow an auditor to ensure that the bank
was not engaging in misbehavior by, e.g., dropping transactions.
2) A simplified block structure: The above description of
higher-level blocks (and the previous description of lower-level
blocks) contains a number of additional values that do not exist
in the blocks of existing cryptocurrencies, making RSCoin
somewhat incompatible with their semantics. To demonstrate
that RSCoin can more strongly resemble these cryptocurrencies,
we briefly describe a way of embedding these additional values
into the set of transactions.
Rather than include the set DPKi+1, the bank could instead
store some units of currency in a master address addrbank and
include in txseti a transaction tx(addrbank
npk−−→ addr(i+1)bank ),
where addr(i+1)bank is an address specific to periodi+1. The bank
could then include in txseti a transaction tx(addr
(i+1)
bank
nm−−→
pkm) for each mintette m authorized for periodi+1. Now, to
check the validity of a particular lower-level block, one could
check that such a transaction was included in the previous
higher-level block.
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C. Incentivizing mintettes
One might naturally imagine that this structure, as currently
described, places the significant burden on the central bank of
having to merge the distinct blocks from each mintette into a
consistent history. By providing appropriate incentives, however,
we can create an environment in which the presented ledger
is in fact consistent before the bank even sees it. If mintettes
deviate from the expected behavior then, as we described in
Section VI-B1, they can be held accountable and punished
accordingly (e.g., not chosen for future periods or not given
any fees they have earned).
Section VI-B1 describes one direct incentive for mintettes
to collect transactions, which is fees. As we described in Sec-
tion VI-B1, mintettes are rewarded only for active participation,
so that an authorized mintette needs to engage with the system
in order to earn fees. Section VI-B2 describes another direct
incentive, which is the authorization of mintettes by the central
bank. For semantic purposes, the value nm used to authorize
each mintette for the next period could be arbitrarily small. As
an incentive, however, this value could be larger to directly
compensate the mintettes for their services.
Finally, we expect that the central bank could be a national
or international entity that has existing relationships with, e.g.,
commercial banks. There thus already exist strong business
incentives and regulatory frameworks for such entities to act
as honest mintettes.
D. Setting system parameters
As described, the system is parameterized by a number of
variables, such as the length of epochs, the length of a period,
and the number of mintettes. The length of an epoch for an
individual mintette is entirely dependent on the rate at which it
processes transactions (as described in detail in Section V-C).
Mintettes that process more transactions will therefore have
shorter epochs than ones that do so less frequently. There is
no limit on how short an epoch can be, and the only upper
limit is that an epoch cannot last longer than a period.
It might seem desirable for periods to be as short as
possible, as ultimately a transaction is sealed into the official
ledger only at the end of a period. To ease the burden on the
bank, however, it is also desirable to have longer periods,
so that central banks have to intervene as infrequently as
possible (and, as we describe in Section VII-A, so that central
banks can potentially perform certain optimizations to reduce
transaction bloat). In Section V-B, we described methods by
which mintettes could “promise” (in an accountable way) to
users that their transactions would be included, so that in
practice near-instantaneous settlement can be achieved even
with longer periods, so long as one trusts the mintette quorum.
Nevertheless, we do not expect periods to last longer than a
day.
For the purposes of having a fair and competitive settlement
process, it is desirable to have as many mintettes as possible;
as we saw in Section V-D1, this is also desirable from a
performance perspective, as the performance of the RSCoin
system (measured in the rate of transactions processed) scales
linearly with the number of mintettes. Adding more mintettes,
however, also has the effect that they earn less in transaction
fees, so these opposing concerns must be taken into account
when settling on a concrete number (to give a very rough idea,
one number that has been suggested [2] is 200).
VII. OPTIMIZATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In Sections V and VI, we presented a (relatively) minimal
version of RSCoin, which allows us to achieve the basic
integrity and scalability properties that are crucial for any
currency designed to be used on a global level. Here, we briefly
sketch some extensions that could be adopted to strengthen
either of these properties, and leave a more detailed analysis
of these or other solutions as interesting future research.
A. Pruning intermediate transactions
At the end of a period, the central bank publishes a higher-
level block containing the collection of transactions that have
taken place in that time interval; it is only at this point that
transactions are officially recorded in the ledger. Because
mintettes provide evidence on a shorter time scale that a user’s
transaction is valid and will be included in the ledger, however,
users might feel more comfortable moving currency multiple
times within a period than in traditional cryptocurrencies (in
which one must wait for one or several blocks to avoid possible
double-spending).
It therefore might be the case that at the end of a period, the
central bank sees not just individual transactions, but potentially
multiple “hops” or even whole “chains” of transactions. To limit
transaction bloat, the bank could thus prune these intermediate
transactions at the end of the period, so that ultimately only
the start and end points of the transaction appear in the ledger,
in a new transaction signed by the central bank.
On its surface, this idea may seem to require a significant
amount of trust in the central bank, as it could now actively
modify the transaction history. The action logs, however, would
reveal the changes that the bank had made and allow users to
audit its behavior, but nevertheless the alterations that could
be made would need be significantly restricted.
B. Further incentives for honest behavior
In addition to the existing incentives for honest behavior
outlined in Sections VI-B1 and VI-C, mintettes could adopt a
sort of proof-of-stake mechanism, in which they escrow some
units of currency with the central bank and are allowed to
collate only a set of transactions whose collective value does
not exceed the escrowed value. If any issue then arises with
the transactions produced by the mintette (e.g., it has accepted
double-spending transactions), the central bank can seize the
escrowed value and remove the double-spending transactions,
so the mintette ultimately pays for this misbehavior out of its
own pocket (and maybe even pays additional fines).
This mechanism as described is not fully robust (as in
particular the mintette might accept many expenditures of
the same unit of currency, not just two), but it does have
an interesting effect on the length of periods. In particular,
the length of earlier periods will necessarily be quite small,
as mintettes will not have much capital to post. As mintettes
accumulate stores of currency, however, periods can grow longer.
This is a fairly natural process, as it also allows for a trial
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period in the beginning to ensure that authorized mintettes
don’t misbehave, and then for a more stable system as a set of
trustworthy mintettes emerges.
C. Multiple banks and foreign exchange
In a global setting, one might imagine that each central
bank could develop their own version of RSCoin; this would
lead, however, to a landscape much the same as today’s
Bitcoin and the many altcoins it has inspired, in which
multiple implementations of a largely overlapping structure
lead to an infrastructure fragmentation: bugs are replicated
across codebases and compatibility across different altcoins is
artificially low.
An attractive approach is for different central banks to
instead use the same platform, to prevent this fragmentation
and to allow users to seamlessly store value in many different
currencies. While this allows the currencies generated by dif-
ferent central banks to achieve some notion of interoperability,
we still expect that different blockchains will be kept separate;
i.e., a particular central bank does not — and should not — have
to keep track of all transactions that are denominated in the
currency of another central bank. (Mintettes, however, may
choose to validate transactions for any number of central banks,
depending on their business interests.)
While every central bank does not necessarily need to be
aware of transactions denominated in the currency of another
central bank, this awareness may at times be desirable. For
example, if a user would like to exchange some units of
one currency into another belonging to a central bank that
is relatively known to and trusted by the first (e.g., exchange
GBP for USD), then this should be a relatively easy process.
The traditional approach is to simply go to a third-party service
that holds units of both currencies, and then perform one
transaction to send units of the first currency to the service,
which will show up in the ledger of the first currency, and
another transaction to receive units of the second currency,
which will show up in the ledger of the second currency.
Although this is the approach by far most commonly
adopted in practice (both in fiat currency and cryptocurrency
markets), it has a number of limitations, first and foremost of
which is that it is completely opaque: even an outside observer
who is able to observe both ledgers sees two transactions that
are not linked in any obvious way. One might naturally wonder,
then, if a more transparent mechansim is possible, in which the
currency exchange shows up as such in the ledger. We answer
this question in the affirmative in the Appendix, in which we
demonstrate a form of fair exchange.
Briefly, to achieve this fair exchange, we adapt a protocol to
achieve atomic cross-chain trading,9 which provides a Bitcoin-
compatible way for two users to fairly exchange units of one
currency for some appropriate units of another currency; i.e.,
to exchange currency in a way that guarantees that either the
exchange is successful or both users end up with nothing
(so in particular it cannot be the case that one user reclaims
currency and the other does not). If one is less concerned about
compatibility with Bitcoin, then a slightly simpler approach
such as “pay on reveal secret” [33] could be adopted.
9The clearest explanation of this for Bitcoin, by Andrew Miller, can be
found at bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=193281.msg3315031#msg3315031.
To fit our setting, in which central banks may want
to maintain some control over which other currencies their
currency is traded into and out of (and in what volume), we
modify the existing protocol to require a third party to sign both
transactions only if they are denominated in currencies that are
viewed as “exchangeable” by that party. This serves to not only
signal the third party’s blessing of the exchange, but also to bind
the two transactions together across their respective blockchains.
Our proposal of this protocol thus enables transparent exchanges
that can be approved by a third party, but does not (and cannot)
prevent exchanges from taking place without this approval.
Importantly, however, an auditor can now — with access to
both blockchains — observe the exchange.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented the first cryptocurrency
framework, RSCoin, that provides the control over monetary
policy that entities such as central banks expect to retain. By
constructing a blockchain-based approach that makes relatively
minimal alterations to the design of successful cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin, we have demonstrated that this centralization
can be achieved while still maintaining the transparency guar-
antees that have made (fully) decentralized cryptocurrencies so
attractive. We have also proposed a new consensus mechanism
based on 2PC and measured its performance, illustrating that
centralization of some authority allows for a more scalable
system to prevent double spending that completely avoids the
wasteful hashing required in proof-of-work-based systems.
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APPENDIX
In Section VII-C, we described a protocol for atomic trading
of different currencies and outlined some of its features, such as
allowing trade only across authorized currencies (as determined
by some third party). Our formal protocol that achieves this
fair exchange is presented in Figure 5.
Informally, if Alice and Bob wish to exchange m units of
currency c1 for n units of currency c2, with the blessing of a
third party Carol, then they each create two types of transactions:
a “spend” transaction, in which the sender releases the units of
currency to one of two addresses, and a “refund” transaction,
in which the sender can reclaim the currency after a certain
amount of time has passed. The two addresses in Alice’s spend
transactions are a “multi-signature” address from which funds
can be released only with the signatures of Alice, Bob, and
Carol, or Bob’s address, from which he can spend the funds
only with knowledge of the pre-image of some hash H(x).
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A C(c, pk, σ,m) B
x
$←− D;h← H(x);h2 ← H(c2) if Sig.Verify(pk,m, σ) = 0 return ⊥ h1 ← H(c1)
(addr, tx1)← SpendTx((h, h2),m, pk(c1)A , pk
(c1)
B , pk
(c1)
C ) else return Sig.Sign(pk
(c)
C ,m)
σC
kk
σ ′C
++
tx2 ← RefundTx(m, addr, pk(c1)A )
σA
$←− Sig.Sign(pk(c1)A , tx2)
>>
if Sig.Verify(pk(c1)C , tx2, σC) = 0 return ⊥
tx2,σA,σC // if Sig.Verify(pk(c1)C , tx2, σA) = 0 return ⊥
if Sig.Verify(pk(c1)A , tx2, σC) = 0 return ⊥
if Sig.Verify(pk(c1)B , tx2, σB) = 0 return ⊥ σB
$←− Sig.Sign(pk(c1)B , tx2)
σBoo
add tx1 to c1 blockchain (addr, tx3)← SpendTx((h, h1), n, pk(c2)B , pk
(c2)
A , pk
(c2)
C )
tx4 ← RefundTx(n, addr, pk(c2)B )
σ′B
$←− Sig.Sign(pk(c2)B , tx4)
PP
if Sig.Verify(pk(c2)C , tx4, σ
′
B) = 0 return ⊥ if Sig.Verify(pk
(c2)
C , tx4, σ
′
C) = 0 return ⊥
tx4,σ
′
B ,σ
′
Coo
if Sig.Verify(pk(c2)B , tx4, σ
′
C) = 0 return ⊥
σ′A
$←− Sig.Sign(pk(c2)A , tx4)
σ′A // if Sig.Verify(pk(c2)A , tx4, σ
′
A) = 0 return ⊥
add tx3 to c2 blockchain
...
before t2: spend tx3 using (x, c1)
x // before t1: spend tx1 using (x, c2)
...
after t2: refund tx2 using (σA, σB , σC) after t1: refund tx4 using (σ′A, σ
′
B , σ
′
C)
Fig. 5: A method for A and B to — with the approval of a third party C — exchange m units of currency c1 for n units of
currency c2 in a fair manner; i.e., in a way such that if either A or B stops participating at any point in the interaction, the other
party loses nothing.
Her refund transaction then sends the currency back to Alice’s
address if signatures are provided by all three parties, and if
an appropriate amount of time t1 has elapsed since the spend
transaction was accepted into the blockchain. Similarly, Bob’s
spend transaction requires Alice to present the pre-image x in
order to redeem the funds, and his refund transaction can be
spent only after some time t2 has passed.
SpendTx(~h, v, pk1, pk2, pk3)
addr←
{
multiaddr(pk1, pk2, pk3) if t > t1
pk2 if H(xi) = h[i] ∀i
return (addr, tx(pk1
v−→ addr))
RefundTx(v, addrin, addrout)
return tx(addrin
v−→ addrout)
Alice begins by creating her spend and refund transactions,
as well as picking the value x and computing H(x). She then
“commits” to the currency c2 being traded with using a second
hash h2 and sends the refund transaction, signed by herself, to
Carol. If Carol is satisfied with the proposed exchange, she can
sign the transaction and give this signature to Alice. Alice now
solicits a signature from Bob; once she has signatures from
both Bob and Carol, she now has a transaction that she can
use to refund her currency after time t1 has passed. Thus, it is
safe for her to publish the spend transaction in the blockchain
for c1. Bob then follows suit by creating his own spend and
refund transactions, soliciting signatures from Alice and Carol,
and publishing his spend transaction once he has a valid refund
transaction that he can use if necessary.
Once both transactions are accepted into their respective
blockchains, Alice — who so far is the only one with knowledge
of the pre-image x— can redeem the n units of currency c2
using Bob’s spend transaction; in doing so, she implicitly
reveals x. Thus, Bob can now redeem the m units of currency c1
using Alice’s spend transaction and the exchange is complete. If
Alice does not redeem Bob’s spend transaction, then after time
t2 Bob can use his refund transaction to redeem the currency
himself (so it is important that t2 < t1).
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